Battle of Mackinac Island (1814)

The Battle of Mackinac Island, fought on 4 August 1814, was the American attempt to recover the strategically vital post that Captain Roberts had captured without a shot in July 1812. The attempt failed – comprehensively – and its failure ensured that Mackinac Island, and with it British influence over the Indigenous nations of the upper Great Lakes, would remain in British hands until the Treaty of Ghent required its return.

The American expedition was substantial by the standards of the northern theatre: approximately 700 regular infantry embarked in five warships under Captain Arthur Sinclair, with Lieutenant Colonel George Croghan in command of the land forces. Croghan had earned a reputation for aggressive defence at Fort Stephenson in 1813, where he had repulsed a British assault. The expedition sailed from Detroit in July 1814.

The approach was badly mishandled. Rather than proceeding directly to Mackinac, Sinclair diverted to search Matchedash Bay for the British supply base at Penetanguishene. The expedition spent a week in fog-bound waters, found nothing, and then sailed to St. Joseph Island, which had been abandoned by the British. They burned the empty post and the North West Company’s trading station at Sault Ste. Marie before finally arriving off Mackinac on 26 July – ten days behind schedule.

The delay was fatal. Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall, who had reinforced the Mackinac garrison earlier in the year with provisions and additional troops brought by an extraordinary canoe expedition from York, had received ample warning of the American approach. He had strengthened the island’s defences, including construction of a new blockhouse (Fort George) on the highest ground, and had been reinforced by approximately 350 Indigenous warriors from the Wisconsin and Michigan territories.

The American ships attempted to bombard the fort for two days, but Sinclair discovered that the new British blockhouse stood too high for naval guns to reach effectively. A dense fog then forced the squadron away from the island for a week. When it returned on 4 August, Croghan decided to land on the north side of the island – roughly where the British had landed in 1812 – and advance overland through the woods to attack the fortifications from the rear.

The plan sacrificed any remaining element of surprise. The American ships bombarded the landing area extensively before the troops went ashore, announcing their intentions to the entire island. McDouall, rather than wait passively in his fortifications, advanced with his regulars and positioned them behind low breastworks facing a clearing on the Americans’ line of advance. His Indigenous warriors were positioned in the dense woods on the flanks.

As the American column advanced through the woods and emerged into the clearing, the warriors opened fire from concealed positions on both sides. Major Andrew Holmes, commanding the American advance guard, was killed almost immediately. The regulars attempted to form and return fire, but the combination of concealed warriors on the flanks and disciplined fire from McDouall’s breastworks in front proved too much. The American advance stalled and then reversed.

Croghan, recognising that he could not force his way through to the fort and unwilling to sustain further casualties in the dense terrain that so favoured the defenders, ordered a re-embarkation. The expedition withdrew to its ships with 13 killed and 51 wounded. British regular casualties were minimal – one killed and seven wounded. Indigenous losses are not recorded with precision.

The consequences extended beyond the island itself. Sinclair, before departing, left two schooners – USS Tigress and USS Scorpion – to blockade the island and prevent British supply. In early September, a combined force of British regulars, fur traders, and Indigenous warriors captured both vessels in a daring night attack, eliminating the last American naval presence on Lake Huron. British control of the upper Great Lakes was complete and would remain so until the peace treaty.

The 1814 Mackinac expedition is a case study in how not to conduct an amphibious operation. The delay, the loss of surprise, the premature bombardment that advertised the landing, and the advance through terrain that favoured the defender all contributed to a failure that was as predictable as it was decisive. The upper Great Lakes, which Roberts had secured for Britain with a bloodless coup in July 1812, remained British to the war’s end.